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A preliminary test on risk and ambiguity attitudes, and time preferences in decisions under 30 
uncertainty: towards a better explanation of participation in crop insurance schemes 31 
 32 
 33 
Abstract. The exposure of farmers to different (and increasing) risks has been recognized by the EU 34 
policy, which supports several risk management tools through the Common Agricultural Policy 35 
(CAP). Despite the vulnerability of the agricultural sector, and the attention paid at the EU level, the 36 
uptake of such tools is generally low across EU countries. The Italian case is emblematic: the uptake 37 
of subsidized crop insurance contracts is low, limited to few products, and concentrated in few areas. 38 
Coherently, the interest of policy makers toward explaining these characteristics and in gaining 39 
insights on the interventions that may help promoting participation is intense. This contribution 40 
investigates behavioral aspects linked to choices under risk and ambiguity, and account for time 41 
preferences in order to mimic the scenario faced by the potential adopters of the subsidized crop 42 
insurance contracts in Italy. Data are collected through questionnaires submitted to students from 43 
agricultural colleges in three administrative regions located in northern, central and southern Italy. 44 
Results show that attitude toward risk, ambiguity, and impatience are correlated with the intrinsic 45 
characteristics of respondents. In addition, some of those attitudes may help explaining decisions 46 
under uncertainty. Despite the empirical analysis is preliminary and focused on students, it allowed 47 
to validate a promising methodological approach capable of explaining farmer’s willingness to adopt 48 
(or renew) insurance contracts. By accounting for (currently under-investigated) behavioral aspects, 49 
it is likely to prove useful to re-design or implementing, more effectively, the current policies. 50 
 51 
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1. Introduction  56 
Risk affects all economic activities, and the agricultural sector shows specific factors that make 57 
yields, input and output prices highly variable. The increased volatility of these variables was shown 58 
in recent years, and it is possibly due to frequent adverse phenomena and extreme climatic events. At 59 
European level all countries are affected, and Italy seems one of the most spoiled country. The Italian 60 
agricultural sector is largely exposed to risky events, as shown by Trestini et al. in 2017. Among EU 61 
members, from 1998 to 2006 Italy registered the highest number of farms experiencing a decline in 62 
farm income exceeding -30% (on average) (European Commission, 2009); moreover, 35% of Italian 63 
farmers experienced income decrease events from 2007 to 2013 (European Commission, 2017). 64 
According to the economic theory, price volatility should incentivize farmers to adopt risk 65 
management tools (RMT): put differently, the increasing uncertainty should increase the latent 66 
demand for RMT. The increasing uncertainty and the availability of new instruments introduced by 67 
the 2008 CAP Health Check should have favoured the diffusion of these policy instruments (e.g., 68 
mutual funds and subsidized insurance contracts). However, the implementation of risk management 69 
tools is limited, and the adoption of these instruments is currently rather scarce. Such a contingent 70 
scenario is worrisome, provided that a correct use of risk management policies would allow EU 71 
countries to increase the resilience of their agricultural sector to external shocks. The EU Regulation 72 
1305/2013 promotes three types of measures, respectively under art. 37, 38 and 39: crop insurance, 73 
mutual funds, and the income stabilization tool. The Italian Ministry has budgeted a large amount of 74 
financial resources to promote these measures but, despite a great attention and a large turmoil, the 75 
experiences on mutual funds and Income Stabilization Tool are scant (Severini et al., 2018; Trestini 76 
et al., 2018), and subsidized single crop insurances are still the most adopted RMT. However, the 77 
subsidized insurance programs are not always stories of success. In Italy, participation in crop 78 
insurance programs is low, heterogeneous, and (recently) declining (Santeramo, 2019), making it a 79 
pressing issue for policymakers. This decline is also associated to recent policy changes. The last 80 
CAP reform has moved the support to RMT to the Rural Development Policy, changing the 81 
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administrative rules of the system. In Italy this transition has resulted in a lack of familiarity with the 82 
rules, in delays in payments for subsidies and indemnifications and, at the end, in a reduced uptake 83 
of crop insurance schemes. 84 
The current literature falls short in explaining the peculiarities of crop insurance adoption in 85 
Italy, and more precisely, it has not explored the potential role of ambiguity aversion and time 86 
preferences on participation in crop insurance programs. 87 
Understanding the behavioral aspects of potential adopters of RMT is crucial to both design 88 
and implement effective policy interventions and avoid low and sparse uptake. The Italian case is an 89 
emblematic one and it allows to focus on long-standing issues that need to be solved at national and 90 
EU level. The Italian (subsidized) crop insurance system is characterized by high adoption rate in the 91 
north, and low participation rate in central and south regions. 92 
Apart from the main drivers of farmer behavior under uncertainty and of adoption of risk 93 
management tools, several attitudinal aspects are likely to matter. Departures from rationality and 94 
non-coherent choices with respect to risk perception help explaining farmers’ choices. A recent study 95 
(Sutter et al., 2013) suggests that attitudes toward ambiguity, due to incomplete information, as well 96 
as differences in risk perception, and in time preferences are likely to play a pivotal role for decisions 97 
under uncertainty. 98 
This paper is a preliminary attempt to assess the validity of an empirical methodology to 99 
evaluate if and how behavioral factors (risk and ambiguity attitudes and time preferences) may affect 100 
the decision-making process under uncertainty. Our setup has been inspired by the framework faced 101 
by potential adopters of crop insurance. The analysis, conducted on a sample of students of 102 
agricultural disciplines allows to conclude on whether the methodological approach is worth 103 
replication to a set of Italian farmers, representative of the latent demand for crop insurance contracts. 104 
The analysis is divided in two steps. First, we investigate how socio-economic characteristics 105 
tend to influence risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and time preferences. Second, we explore how 106 
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socio-economic characteristics as well as risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and time preferences may 107 
help explaining choices under uncertainty (smoking, practicing sport and playing lottery). 108 
 109 
2. On Italian insurance market and factors affecting farmers’ adoption 110 
2.1 The Italian market for subsidized crop insurance contracts 111 
Risks linked to natural disasters have been recognized since long-time in agriculture as 112 
unexpected sources of losses for farmers, especially for those highly vulnerable that are not adopters 113 
of risk management strategies. The shift from ex post compensations to ex-ante measures, and to 114 
subsidized crop insurance contracts, has been a concrete effort to promote the diffusion of risk 115 
management strategies. 116 
According to ISMEA (2018), the Italian market (2004-2010) is characterized by a limited 117 
adoption of insurance contracts. Subsidized insurance market reached a maximum of 265,000 118 
contracts in 2008, followed by declines in the number of contract subscriptions. Differently, total 119 
compensation rose constantly, signalling the low (economic) sustainability of the system, exacerbated 120 
by an adversely selective participation process: as contacts’ prices rise, farmers with lower probability 121 
of facing adversities quit the market, contributing to the increase of the total amount of compensations 122 
paid by insurers (and by public funds). Since 2010 the public contribution to contracts decreased to 123 
65% (according to EU Reg. 73/2009) and has been devoted (since 2014) to contracts that cover at 124 
least three climatic adversities. These changes do not seem to push the market too far. Last (public) 125 
data referred to 2015 (ISMEA, 2018) depicts a similar picture: from 2010 to 2015 contracts have 126 
decreased by 20% (from 210,000 to 168,000), while the insured area remained unaltered (+5%); the 127 
insured value raised by 20% as well (from 4.8 to 5.6 billion euro), and it has generated a 4% increase 128 
in the premium paid by farmers and through public funds (from 279 to 381 mil euro). The 129 
geographical distribution of contracts tends to be concentrated in northern regions, which account for 130 
more than 80% of the insured value (ISMEA, 2018). In addition, only few products account for most 131 
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of the total insured value: indeed, apple, corn, rice, grapes, and tomatoes account for 2/3 of the 132 
covered value.  133 
 134 
2.2 On the drivers of crop insurance uptake  135 
The identification of the drivers of crop insurance uptake is still open and vivid (Enjolras et al., 136 
2011; Santeramo et al., 2016). More important, there has been a limited effort in investigating how 137 
farmers’ behavioral aspects may help explaining the adoption and/or renewal of crop insurance 138 
contracts, exception made for Menapace et al. (2015). 139 
Key drivers of uptake are the age and the income level: Ogurtsov et al. (2009) found a positive 140 
correlation for age and adoption of crop insurance contracts, while Wąs and Kobus (2018), Liesivaara 141 
and Myyrä (2017) and van Winsen et al. (2016) suggested that the opposite is true; as for the income 142 
level, Menapace et al. (2015) found a positive correlation with uptake, while Wąs and Kobus (2018) 143 
and Farrin et al. (2016) concluded on the opposite direction for correlation. 144 
Ambiguous results have also been found for risk aversion, which has been found positively 145 
correlated with age, according to Nielsen et al. (2013) and van Winsen et al. (2016), and negatively 146 
correlated according to Franken et al. (2017) and Goldstein et al. (2008). Heterogeneous results are 147 
also reported for the farm size, positively correlated with risk awareness in Franken et al. (2017), and 148 
negatively correlated with risk awareness according to van Winsen et al. (2016). 149 
Furthermore, the low participation level may be due to a low level of familiarity with the 150 
instrument (Santeramo, 2018 and 2019; Santeramo et al., 2016). Subscription of new contracts tend 151 
to be influenced by size, degree of crop diversification and irrigated area (Enjolras and Sentis, 2011; 152 
Finger and Lehmann, 2012); moreover, Santeramo et al. (2016) argued that farmers tend to consider 153 
crop diversification (and irrigation) and insurance contracts as alternate management strategies with 154 
a high degree of substitutability. The policy framework is also playing a role: for instance, greening 155 
requirements push toward crop diversification to help preserving the environment; measures of 156 
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income support (e.g. direct payments or agri-environmental measures) are aimed at reducing famers’ 157 
income instability and may prove substitutes for other risk management tools (Severini et al., 2017).  158 
A contingent scenario, faced by Italian farmers, is that the bureaucratic aspects related to 159 
subscription and reimbursement procedures, and the delays in refunds (ISMEA, 2018), may have 160 
discouraged participation and renewal of crop insurance contracts. From 2010 to 2014 the share of 161 
new adopters (14%) of (subsidized) crop insurance contracts has exceeded the number of farmers 162 
who gave up (11%). Differently, and possibly due to the delays in payments and to the (perceived) 163 
ambiguity of the newly adopted rules, in 2015 the quitters overcame new adopters, and the net balance 164 
between new entrants and leavers was largely negative (-11%). 165 
 166 
3. Methodology and data collection 167 
The above presented scenario has emphasized the importance of focusing on three specific 168 
aspects: risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and time preferences. This paper investigates how attitudes 169 
toward uncertainty (risk and ambiguity) as well as time preferences influence risky decisions. The 170 
dataset includes data on 50 students from three different universities (Faculty of Agricultural 171 
Sciences) in Italy: namely, the University of Padova (Padova) in the North, Tuscia University 172 
(Viterbo) in Central Italy and University of Foggia (Foggia) in the South. The research is part of a 173 
wider ongoing study aiming at investigating Italian farmers’ decision making under uncertainty: 174 
particularly, the broader aim is to study the factors influencing the insurance schemes’ uptake. The 175 
experimental methodology is inspired by the canonical Holt and Laury (2002) choice lists and, more 176 
specifically, by the approach proposed by Sutter et al. (2013). In order to elicit individual preferences 177 
related to risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and time preferences, respondents received a structured 178 
questionnaire with three experiments and ten control questions. 179 
More specifically, the first and the second experiments (Fig. 1) is made by a list of 11 choices 180 
with two options each: at any given choice respondents choose between a sure payoff (option A), and 181 
a gamble (option B). The sure payoff is iteratively decreased (from 100 to 1€) so to elicit the 182 
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indifference point between the lottery and the sure payoff. The lottery has been simulated by 183 
extracting a random number from a uniform distribution ranging from 1 to 100 being the number 50 184 
excluded (in order to have symmetrical probability distributions between the two outcomes). In the 185 
first experiment, aimed at eliciting risk preferences, respondents may win (for instance) 100€ if the 186 
randomly extracted number ranges between 1 and 49, or nothing, if the randomly extracted number 187 
is larger than 51. In order to get respondents acquainted with the functioning of the lottery, 188 
respondents have been exposed to a computer simulation of ten random draws from 1 to 100 (the 189 
extraction of the number 50 implies a further extraction), and have been informed on the cases in 190 
which they would have won the lottery. The second experiment, aimed at eliciting ambiguity 191 
aversion, compares the choices for a sure payoff and a (ambiguous) lottery. The lottery pays out if, 192 
by extracting two random draws, the second extraction gives a larger number than the one extracted 193 
in the first place. The ambiguity arises by a peculiarity: the result of the first extraction is not revealed, 194 
whereas only the second extraction (and the outcome of the lottery) is revealed. For instance, by 195 
drawing the number 20 and successively the number 35, the lottery results in a winning outcome.  196 
 197 
Figure 1: Example of a choice list for experiment 1 (risk attitude) and 2 (ambiguity attitude) 198 
 Option A  Option B  
1 Sure payoff  Lottery  
2 Sure payoff  Lottery  
3 Sure payoff  Lottery  
Source: own elaboration 199 
 200 
Finally, in the third experiment aiming at measuring time preferences (Fig. 2), respondents 201 
received two lists (blocks) of ten choice sets each. Each choice set consisted in two sure payoffs (A 202 
and B) that respondents may receive in different periods: option A is a “early payoff” of 100€, 203 
whereas option B is a “late payoff” which is increased from 100€ to 190€. Depending on respondents’ 204 
 9 
 
preference for receiving a sure payoff earlier (i.e., “now”) or later (i.e., “in 12 months”), we elicited 205 
respondents’ attitude in delaying the win (or, put differently, their impatience). 206 
 207 
Figure 2: Example of a choice list for experiment 3 (time preference) 208 
 Option A  Option B  
1 Receive 100€ today  Receive 100€ in 12 months  
2 Receive 100€ today  Receive 110€ in 12 months  
3 Receive 100€ today  Receive 120€ in 12 months  
Source: own elaboration 209 
 210 
Prior to the survey, we paid attention to ensuring that participants were able to understand the 211 
questions, and that the experiments were correctly explained. We design a random lottery incentive 212 
system (Cubitt et al., 2019), often used in individual choice experiments, to motivate respondents to 213 
reveal their true preferences: at the end of the experiments we run a real lottery with the ten percent 214 
of (randomly selected) respondents: if their questionnaires did not present incoherent answers (as 215 
found in all cases), they played the game presented in the questionnaire with the possibility of winning 216 
part of the money of the bet (more precisely, 10% of the money at stake), in case of favourable 217 
outcome.  218 
The individual Certainty Equivalent (CE) has been calculated for experiment 1 and 2 (CEr and 219 
CEa, respectively), as midpoint between the two consequent payoffs for which the interviewee 220 
switched from option A (i.e., sure payoff) to option B (i.e., gamble). Accordingly, CE represents the 221 
payoff that makes the individual indifferent between receiving the sure amount and gambling. To 222 
measure risk attitude (experiment 1), we calculated the coefficient of risk aversion (r) as follows 223 
(Sutter et al., 2013): 224 
   𝑟 = 1 − ಴ಶೝഏ     (1) 225 
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with π representing the prize of the gamble (i.e., 100€). This coefficient ranges from 0 to 1, with 226 
values of r larger than 0.5 indicating risk aversion, whereas smaller than 0.5 risk loving and equal to 227 
0.5 risk neutrality. Moreover, in the second experiment we measured the coefficient of ambiguity 228 
attitude (a) as follows: 229 
𝑎 = ஼ாೝି ஼ாೌ
஼ாೝା ஼ாೌ
      (2) 230 
The coefficient a ranges from -1 to 1, with negative numbers representing ambiguity loving, 0 231 
standing for ambiguity neutrality and positive numbers indicating ambiguity aversion. As regards the 232 
third experiment, we calculated the Future Equivalent (FE) of the fixed payoff as the midpoint 233 
between the two consequent later payoffs where the interviewee decided to switch from option A to 234 
B. The larger the FE, the larger the aversion for delayed payments (i.e., impatience). Finally, in order 235 
to control for the main drivers of decisions under uncertainty, we collected information on age (age), 236 
gender (gender), number of university credits achieved (ECTS credits), average grade (max 30) 237 
(average grade), and on whether the respondent does not have a technical high school degree (degree), 238 
on smoking habits (being a smoker), on habits to practice physical activity (sport practicing), and on 239 
habits to play lottery or sport betting at least once a month (playing lottery). Finally, we recorded 240 
whether the respondent is owner (or son of the owner) of a farm (family farm) and, whether the 241 
respondent have ever worked on a farm even for a short period of time (farmworker). 242 
The empirical strategy is admittedly simple, yet rigorous and comparable with the approach 243 
suggested in Sutter et al. (2013). First, we use a linear regression to conclude on the effects of some 244 
socio-demographic variables on: i) the coefficient of risk aversion (r), ii) the coefficient of ambiguity 245 
aversion (a), iii) time preferences (i.e., future equivalent at 12 months). Second, we use a linear 246 
regression to investigate how risk aversion, ambiguity aversion and time preferences (FE_12m) 247 
influence behaviors characterized by decisions under uncertainty: i) being a smoker; ii) sport 248 
practicing; iii) playing lottery.  249 
  250 
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4. Hypothesis testing and results 251 
As shown in table 1, the sample consists of 78 observations, mostly male students (78%). Most 252 
participants have not a technical high school background (51%), are not smokers (64%), practice 253 
sports activities (60%), and do not play lotteries (80%). The average number of credits acquired by 254 
sampled students is 132, while the average grade is 26. In terms of coefficients of risk aversion and 255 
risk ambiguity, we have quite heterogeneous results: the coefficient of risk aversion ranges from 0.05 256 
to 0.95 the coefficient of ambiguity aversion ranges from -0.50 to 0.83. Similarly, we have time 257 
preferences computed at 12 months ranging from 105 to 185. 258 
 259 
Table 1. Descriptive statistics of the sample (N = 78) 260 
Variable Type   % Mean Std Min Max 
Age Continuous     23.39 2.22 20 29 
Gender Dummy 1 = male 78.20     
    0 = female 21.80         
Degree1 Dummy 1 = yes 51.30       
    0 = no 48.70         
ECTS credits2 Continuous     131.51 57.99 23 300 
Average grade (max 30) Continuous     25.72 2.04 21 29.7 
Family farm Dummy 1 = yes 28.20   
  
    0 = no 71.80     
Farm worker Dummy 1 = yes 61.50   
  
    0 = no 38.50     
Being a smoker Dummy 1 = yes 35.90   
  
    0 = no 64.10     
Sport practicing Dummy 1 = yes 60.30   
  
    0 = no 39.70     
Playing lottery Dummy 1 = yes 20.50   
  
    0 = no 79.50   
r Continuous     0.48 0.16 0.05 0.95 
a Continuous     0.08 0.22 -0.50 0.83 
FE_12m Continuous     146.54 20.83 105 185 
1 Subjects without a technical high school background (“Liceo” in Italy). 261 
2 ECTS credits express the volume of learning based on the defined learning outcomes and their 262 
associated workload. 60 ECTS credits are allocated to the learning. 263 
 264 
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The sample is mainly composed of risk averse (51%) and ambiguity averse students (51%), 265 
whereas the future equivalent shows a greater impatience for risk neutral and ambiguity averse 266 
subjects (table 2). 267 
 268 
Table 2. Risk and ambiguity attitude (%) and future equivalent (N = 78) 269 
Category % Average FE_12m1 
Risk averse 51.3% 146.50 (20.07) 
Risk neutral 24.4% 149.21 (24.79) 
Risk seeker 24.4% 143.95 (18.83) 
Ambiguity averse 51.3% 148.00 (20.78) 
Ambiguity neutral 19.2% 147.00 (23.36) 
Ambiguity seeker 29.5% 143.70 (19.84) 
1 Standard deviations are reported in parentheses. 270 
 271 
We regress attitudes toward risk and ambiguity on control factors (table 3). The considered 272 
observable characteristics do not allow to explain these attitudes. Regarding risk aversion, only the 273 
variable “degree” is positively correlated with risk aversion, regardless of students’ career 274 
characteristics (number of credits acquired) and average grade, and of respondent’s social 275 
characteristics (gender, age, farm owner and farming experience). There are no significant 276 
coefficients in the case of ambiguity aversion. 277 
Results seems to be in line with studies (e.g. Sutter et al., 2013) that refer risk attitude and 278 
ambiguity not influenced by ordinarily observable characteristics.  279 
As shown in table 4, we also found a positive significant correlation between the degree of 280 
impatience and gender, degree and past experience in farm work, showing that males with non-281 
technical degree are less impatient, while subjects who already had a work experience related to 282 
agricultural sector are more impatient. Conversely, we did not find any relevant effect for risk and 283 
ambiguity aversion. In general, we found that attitudes toward uncertainty (risk aversion, ambiguity 284 
aversion, and impatience) are correlated with intrinsic characteristics of the students, hereafter 285 
referred as control factors. 286 
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 287 
Table 3. OLS - Risk Aversion (r) and Ambiguity Aversion (a) 288 
  Dep. Var. Dep. Var. 
  Risk Aversion (r) Ambiguity Aversion (a) 
  β S.E. P>|t|  β S.E. P>|t|   
Age 0.003 0.010 0.756  -0.012 0.013 0.355  
Gender 0.033 0.046 0.476  0.008 0.063 0.900  
Degree 0.068 0.040 0.088 * -0.082 0.055 0.137  
ECTS credits -0.001 0.001 0.185  0.001 0.001 0.448  
Average grade 0.008 0.010 0.456  0.015 0.014 0.307  
Family farm -0.032 0.046 0.486  -0.036 0.064 0.568  
Farmworker 0.006 0.042 0.888  0.024 0.058 0.678  
cons 0.278 0.328 0.401  -0.036 0.457 0.983  
Obs 78 78 
Prob > F 0.574 0.695 
Adj R2 -0.017 -0.031 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 289 
 290 
Table 4. OLS - Impatience (FE_12m) 291 
  Dep. Var. 
 Future equivalent 12 months (FE_12m) 
  β S.E. P>|t|   
Age 0.039 1.234 0.975  
Gender -9.918 5.831 0.094 * 
Degree -8.656 5.146 0.097 * 
ECTS credits -0.037 0.053 0.484  
Average grade 0.998 1.330 0.455  
Family farm -7.290 5.873 0.219  
Farmworker 9.760 5.331 0.072 * 
r 11.212 16.183 0.491  
a 9.264 11.626 0.428  
cons 127.054 42.084 0.004  
Obs 78 
Prob > F 0.206 
Adj R2 0.045 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 292 
 293 
Following Sutter et al. (2013) we use the control factors (age, gender, degree, ECTS credits, 294 
average grade, family farm, and farmworker) and the attitudes toward risk, ambiguity and time, to 295 
 14 
 
explain decisions under uncertainty. We regress “being a smoker”, “sport practicing” and “playing 296 
lottery” on control factors and variables on attitudes.  297 
We found that average grade and risk aversion are statistically significant having a negative 298 
effect on being a smoker, whereas impatience has a slight positive effect on the same characteristic 299 
(Table 5). Impatience seems to play a slight role on sport practicing too, being instead negatively 300 
correlated. Regarding playing lottery, a significant positive correlation emerged for gender (all 301 
respondents that practice gambling are males), number of credits acquired (with a positive slight 302 
coefficient close to zero) and being part of a family involved in farming activities. Average grade 303 
shows negative correlation indeed.  304 
 305 
Table 5. OLS Estimates on being a smoker, sport practicing, and playing lottery  306 
 Dep. Var. Dep. Var. Dep. Var. 
  Being a smoker Sport practicing Playing lottery 
  β S.E. P>|t|  β S.E. P>|t|   β S.E. P>|t|   
Age 0.029 0.028 0.310  - 0.030 0.465  - 0.022 0.643  
Gender - 0.136 0.506  0.169 0.146 0.248  0.265 0.108 0.016 ** 
Degree 0.139 0.120 0.250  - 0.128 0.584  0.116 0.095 0.225  
ECTS credits - 0.001 0.986  0.001 0.001 0.739  0.002 0.001 0.019 ** 
Average grade  - 0.031 0.074 * 0.038 0.033 0.250  - 0.024 0.011 ** 
Family farm - 0.136 0.792  0.078 0.145 0.594  0.215 0.107 0.050 * 
Farmworker 0.075 0.125 0.548  - 0.134 0.805  0.021 0.099 0.830  
r - 0.371 0.016 ** 0.232 0.397 0.561  - 0.294 0.404  
a - 0.267 0.145  0.242 0.286 0.399  - 0.211 0.423  
FE_12m 0.005 0.003 0.093 * - 0.003 0.079 * - 0.002 0.523  
cons 0.850 1.025 0.410  0.636 1.095 0.563  1.767 0.811 0.033  
Obs. 78 78 78 
Prob > F 0.134 0.590 0.008 
Adj R2 0.069 -0.021 0.179 
Note: *** Significant at the 1% level; ** Significant at the 5% level; * Significant at the 10% level 307 
 308 
Respondents showing little risk aversion and high levels of impatience smoke more, whereas 309 
less impatient individuals practice sport more. Men are found to play lottery more than women. As 310 
shown by “ECTS credits”, best students play lottery more, whereas “average grade” shows that best 311 
students play lottery and smoke to a lesser extent. Interestingly, the higher the impatience (i.e., 312 
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subjects who have a higher future equivalent with 12 month-delay condition), the less they practice 313 
sport. Lastly, ambiguity aversion coefficients don’t show significant relations with the analysed 314 
dependent variables. 315 
To summarize, both observable characteristics and behavioral characteristics (risk aversion, 316 
ambiguity aversion and time preferences) help explaining choices under uncertainty, particularly 317 
smoking and playing lottery. It is important to note that, as expected, risk aversion is negatively 318 
correlated with smoking while impatience is positively correlated with smoking while negatively with 319 
practicing sport. 320 
 321 
5. Concluding remarks 322 
Risk management policies for the primary sector are under the spotlight in the EU: large 323 
subsidies have been granted for crop insurance programs and mutual funds. The EU Regulation 324 
1305/2013 establishes rules and funds that may be adopted by Member States to promote participation 325 
in crop insurance programs (art. 37), to start and manage mutual funds (art. 38) and to enhance the 326 
start of the Income Stabilization Tool (art. 39). Despite the clear interest of the policymakers, the 327 
academic debate seems behind. The economic literature provides several hints to explain farmers’ 328 
uptake in crop insurance programs, but several determinants (other than farm size, farmers’ education, 329 
relationships with other risk management strategies, and insurance premia) are still under-330 
investigated. In particular, while the literature on insurance programs (i.e. health, car and life 331 
insurance) have emphasized the role of information, and of individual attitudes toward uncertainty, 332 
ambiguity and impatience, there is little evidence on the role of ambiguity and impatience on farmers’ 333 
decision to adopt crop insurance contracts.  334 
Based on these premises, we test the validity of a methodology in exploring how risk and 335 
ambiguity aversion, and impatience may influence the decision-making process for risky activities. 336 
Our test, conducted on a sample of students, has been calibrated on behavioral aspects that are likely 337 
to matter for potential adopters of (subsidized) crop insurance contracts. We ask students involved in 338 
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university programs related to agricultural sciences if they work in a farm or are owners of a farm. 339 
Similarly, we investigate decisions under uncertainty proxying risky decisions such as those related 340 
to the adoption of crop insurance programs.  341 
We found that the attitudes toward uncertainty (risk aversion, ambiguity aversion, and time 342 
preferences) are weakly correlated with some intrinsic characteristics of the students. These attitudes 343 
cannot be satisfactorily explained by few observable characteristics. In contrast, we found evidences 344 
that attitudes toward risk and impatience may help explaining agents’ decisions under uncertainty. 345 
This suggests including agents’ attitudes in future research to prevent biased inference due to missing 346 
explanatory factors which would lead to ineffective policy recommendations.  347 
Despite the analysis is still preliminary and applied to students, the approach we have taken 348 
seems promising in explaining potential residual factors that may affect farmer’s willingness to adopt 349 
(or renew) insurance contracts. Hence, future research on this latter issue should take into 350 
consideration not only farmers’ risk aversion but ambiguity aversion and time preferences as well. 351 
These factors may be used to explain the limited (and heterogeneous) uptake of insurances. 352 
Furthermore, the empirical findings may help to better design and manage future policy measures: 353 
understanding the role of time preferences may be useful to address how delayed payments of 354 
reimbursements and indemnities may discourage participation.  355 
 356 
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